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As in the past, Americans owe Jean-Claude Paye a debt of gratitude. From his position, as a sociologist in Brussels,
he has proven that he can see what is happening in George Bush’s and Dick Cheney’s America, more clearly
perhaps than many who live in the United States.
As Paye notes, there are two important aspects to the regime created by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)
and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The MCA recognizes a distinction between “enemy combatants”
who are citizens of the United States and those who are aliens. Alien enemy combatants are, as Paye notes,
subjected entirely to the regime of military commissions and denied access to civil courts except under limited
circumstances. Citizen enemy combatants have access to civil courts, but find their rights constricted in other ways.
The alien-citizen distinction in the MCA is a congressional response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, in which a five-justice majority held that the president did not have the power to strip citizens and aliens
alike of their right of access to civil courts and to the writ of habeas corpus. The Court invited the president to return
to Congress to validate his claims of power, and Congress obligingly did so, thus proving that there are few persons
in the elected leadership willing to raise a voice against the imperial powers of which Paye writes.
For Americans having some direct or vicarious experience in the political struggles of the past six decades—that is
to say since the 1940s—the definition of enemy combatant is chillingly familiar. The initial determination of
culpability is made based on either (1) membership in or affiliation with al Qaeda, which is hardly an organization in
the sense of having a defined structure, or (2) conduct that amounts—with some exceptions that I note below—to
material support of hostilities against the United States. The definition of enemy combatant may also attach even to
those who engage only in acts that are merely preparatory, or done with a forbidden intention without provable
present danger or effect. The elastic and elusive meaning of “al Qaeda,” coupled with the vagueness and
overbreadth of prohibited association, vests unfettered discretion in executive officers who are in charge of rounding
up and detaining suspects.
This broad-gauge approach is not new, but rather an extension into new territory of a definitional structure adopted
by the Clinton administration in 1994, and based upon ideas that have been central to repressive legislation for
decades past. To evaluate this assertion, let us consider some basic principles of constitutional law.
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech and association. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, speech that advocates unlawful violence is constitutionally protected unless uttered with the
intent to cause such violence imminently and under circumstances showing a clear and present danger that this is
what is about to happen. That is, one can believe, teach, and advocate that U.S. policy is wrong, that the alleged
enemies of the United States should prevail, that socialism should replace capitalism, and—as Brandenburg was
himself advocating—that people wreak vengeance on public officials.
A second and related idea is that one is free to associate with a group that has demonstrably unlawful objectives,
absent proof that one intends by one’s actions to further those objectives. After all, many political associations
engage in both lawful and unlawful activity. In the 1961 case of Noto v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction for membership in an organization devoted to overthrowing the government; the prosecution had not
proved that Noto’s membership went beyond supporting the constitutionally protected activities of the organization.
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And note that those latter activities might well include advocacy of violence.
The most sweeping repudiation of the constitutionally based limiting principles introduced by the Clinton
administration’s 1994 definitional structure is in connection with the term “material support.” If someone in the United
States sent munitions to a group that was engaged in armed conflict with U.S. forces, that would be the sort of
“material support” that one could understand and that would form the basis for valid and limited criminal laws.
However, that term has been part of several laws prohibiting actions that allegedly support terrorism since at least
1994. In the Patriot Act and related legislation, the term has acquired an enormously expanded meaning.
If an alien—someone not a citizen—is compelled to serve as a cook or nurse for Taliban forces or some group
allegedly tied to al Qaeda, that person has provided material support and is subject to exclusion from asylum in the
United States and possible designation as an enemy combatant. If a group of people in the United States contribute
to a Muslim charity based in a foreign country, some of whose activities are alleged to support actions contrary to
U.S. interests, they become targets of prosecution for material support and for designation as enemy combatants.
The definition of material support has thus gone beyond limits dictated by the nature of the support provided, or
indeed to a large extent the intention with which it was given. This stretching of the ordinary meaning of words has
occurred in circumstances even more dangerous to the right of political speech. Consider the case of Lynne Stewart,
a courageous lawyer in New York, who now stands convicted of, among other things, agreeing to provide material
support to an organization devoted to violence.
The organization in question is the Egyptian Islamic Group, long an opponent of the repressive Egyptian
government. That government has, even according to the annual country reports by the U.S. Department of State,
an abysmal human rights record. Lynne Stewart was trial counsel for Sheikh Abdel Rahman in New York in 1995–
96. Sheikh Abdel was charged with complicity in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and convicted on doubtful
evidence.
After his conviction, he was put into solitary confinement in a prison hospital. He is blind, aged, and a diabetic. He
does not speak English. His sole contact with the world outside prison was by means of visits from his legal team
and occasional telephone conversations with his wife and other close family members. These latter conversations
were monitored overtly, and many of his lawyer visits recorded covertly.
Lynne Stewart gave two interviews to the Egyptian press, reporting Sheikh Abdel Rahman’s views on whether the
Islamic Group should continue its policy of not engaging in armed struggle against the Egyptian regime. These
statements did not advocate violence. They simply raised the issue of whether nonviolence was a preferable path,
and left the issue to those in Egypt; those in Egypt decided to maintain the policy of nonviolence. No person was
killed or even harmed as a result of these statements.
The government claimed, and the trial court agreed, that Stewart provided “material support” in the form of
“personnel,” by repeating her client’s statements. That is, the Bush administration successfully argued that political
speech on a matter of public interest, without proof of clear and present danger, was classifiable as unlawful.
These observations suggest the danger that lurks in the expanding definitions of criminal support for alleged
terrorism. However, in most of the cases, including Lynne Stewart’s, the regular courts are open and available to
make arguments about constitutional protection. Asylum-seekers, however, do not have such rights; there are
avenues of judicial review available to them, but these are provably inadequate. The expanding criminalization of
speech and association traces paths familiar to those involved in the political struggles of past decades.
Citizens classified as enemy combatants under these expansive definitions will at least have access to civil courts.
We shall see whether those courts will exercise judgment independent of presidential proclamation. The legislative
branch has not set a good example of independence. Recent decisions by federal courts in cases related to the
“war on terrorism” have contained some courageous statements on governmental overreaching as well as some
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distinctly supine acceptance of executive power.

The Radical Departure
But as Paye notes, the most radical departure of the proclamations, the DTA and the MCA, is with respect to aliens
who are deemed “enemy combatants.” As Paye notes, the administration’s evident intention is to deny any such
person the right of habeas corpus, that is access to a civilian court where the government must prove by lawful and
reliable evidence that it has the right to hold the detainee. Moreover, this unreviewable detention is claimed to be of
indefinite duration, and under conditions of solitary confinement, with interrogation practices that in the view of many
amount to torture, without access to independent counsel, and with no right in any forum to make a meaningful
challenge or denial.
One needs to be clear about this. Those of us engaged in representing detainees do not concede that the civil
courts have no power, and that the Bush administration’s objective can go unchallenged. We shall see. But one
must examine the administration’s claim to see that it in fact represents a qualitative rupture with the claimed system
of constitutional governance. Abandoning the pretense of the state as neutral arbiter, the administration has
unilaterally abrogated the social contract of which constitutional jurists have often spoken.
To be sure, the contract reference is somewhat figurative, but no less powerful for all that. The most celebrated
example is the case of Judith Coplon, an American lawyer accused in 1949 of attempting to commit espionage on
behalf of the Soviet Union. The FBI had conducted illegal wiretaps to collect evidence against her, and resisted
disclosing them to the court. Learned Hand, writing for the court of appeals, held that the wiretaps must be
disclosed, so that the court could determine whether the prosecutors had used unlawfully obtained evidence in
Coplon’s prosecution. Judge Hand expressed the idea that the government cannot have it both ways. Once it
decides that someone should be punished, it cannot retreat behind a curtain of “state secrecy” and deny the
defense access to information that may lead a jury to acquit, even if that information is the most sensitive “national
security” material that can be imagined.
To take an even broader perspective, the Constitution contains a number of specific provisions that govern the ways
in which the state can inflict punishment on people. The Sixth Amendment says that “in all criminal prosecutions,”
the accused shall have the right to counsel, to jury trial, to confront the evidence against him or her, and so on. The
Fifth Amendment says that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process, which means
at least an impartial tribunal that hears reliable, lawful evidence. That amendment also says that “no person” shall
be tried for a serious crime except after indictment by a grand jury. Criminal trials are to be presided over by a judge
appointed for life and nominally independent of the executive branch, and this is not only by Article III of the
Constitution but the long tradition that it embodies. Under the Fourth Amendment, a judicial warrant is necessary to
authorize searches; the amendment was written by people familiar with the concept of treason and revolution, but
grants the executive branch no exceptions for such cases.
There are exceptions to these principles, but the only one that is possibly relevant is the provision that Congress can
“make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,” which includes the power to establish
courts martial for offenses within military jurisdiction. The MCA system for trying alien enemy combatants does not
provide even the protections given a defendant in a general court martial; more on this issue later.
The Constitution also confers upon Congress the power to define and punish piracy and other offenses against the
law of nations. At the time the Constitution was adopted, there were plenty of aliens shooting at Americans and
taking their property and otherwise endangering international peace. These people were called “pirates.” Congress
possesses carefully defined constitutional powers with respect to piracy. The practice in 1787 was to capture pirates
and bring them into port for trial.1
Thus, the system of federal criminal law and procedure established by the Constitution is, on a careful reading, allinclusive and not admitting of exceptions. We must, however, acknowledge that the history of armed conflict has
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revealed instances where civilians and soldiers were treated in ways that do not meet the standards the Constitution
established. The international community has addressed this issue directly, and the United States is party to a series
of treaties that protect combatants and civilians when there is armed conflict. Most of these protective principles are
codified in the Geneva Conventions, which protect prisoners of war and noncombatants, and the Hague
Conventions, which regulate the conduct of warfare. Rules of customary international law supplement and extend
these protections.
It was generally understood until the Bush administration’s proclamations and the ensuing legislation that this
Constitution and treaty-based system did indeed cover all the possibilities for the United States detaining, trying, and
punishing people who were engaged in or affected by armed conflict. There is, in these concepts of “enemy
combatant,” and particularly “alien enemy combatant,” as people without rights and without the means to enforce
rights, a chilling reminder of an earlier dark chapter in American history. I refer to chattel slavery. The Bush
administration has reverted to a juridical technique of finding a hole in the constitutional fabric, through which will fall
all members of this denominated class of persons—alien enemy combatants.
Almost everyone recognizes the name Dred Scott, and has heard of the Dred Scott case. Dred Scott was born into
slavery, in about 1795. In the 1830s, his owner lived and worked in Illinois and in the Wisconsin Territory. Under
Illinois law at that time, a slave brought into the state was regarded as free, and would not regain slave status upon
return to a state in which slavery was legal. During this period, there were fierce political battles, and even armed
conflict, over the issue of extending slavery as new territory was incorporated into the United States and new states
were created.
When Scott’s master returned to Missouri, a slave state, he hired Scott out as a slave, which was unlawful under
Illinois law but apparently permitted under the law of Missouri. Scott sued, first in state court and then in federal
court, to have his freedom recognized. His litigation was supported by abolitionist lawyers and their supporters.
Scott claimed that the federal court had jurisdiction over his case because he was a citizen of Missouri and his
“owner,” Sanford, was a citizen of New York. This was a claim of diversity of citizenship, a category recognized
explicitly in the federal Constitution and in the first Judiciary Act. Scott claimed that Sanford had assaulted him, but
the heart of the case was the claim—necessarily involved in the claim of assault, that Scott was a free person
entitled to have his rights respected.
The case finally arrived in the Supreme Court in 1854, and the Court heard days of argument in February and again
in December 1856. By that time, the slavery controversy was at the center of political attention. James Buchanan
was elected president in 1856, to be inaugurated on March 4, 1857. Buchanan attempted to influence the Court’s
members to decide the case against Scott, hoping that such a decision would establish the constitutional position of
slavery and end the national debate on the subject.
The Court issued its judgment by a vote of six to three, on March 6, 1857, two days after Buchanan’s inauguration.
The lead opinion was by Chief Justice Roger Taney of Maryland. The Court held that Scott was not a citizen of
Missouri and indeed lacked the capacity to be a citizen of any state. It then went on to hold that territorial legislatures
—and by necessary inference state legislatures—lacked the power to enact legislation that gave slaves their
freedom upon entering the territory. Such statutes, Taney said, would deprive slave owners of their property.
A few celebrated quotations from Taney’s opinion will remind readers of how telling is the analogy to what the Bush
administration is now trying to do:
[N]o State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the rights and
privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although, so far as the State alone was
concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities
which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.
****
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[N]o State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member
into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States.
Those who wrote the Constitution, Taney said, thought that Africans, slave or free, were “beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” Indeed, said Taney, accepting Scott’s position “would give
to persons of the negro race…the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased…the full liberty of speech
in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”
The decision in Dred Scott made the Civil War inevitable. Abolitionists, such as Frederick Douglass, had held hope
that slavery might be abolished by constitutional interpretation. He read the Constitution differently than did Taney,
as recognizing slavery in two important respects: first, by providing that a slave would be counted only as three-fifths
of a person for purposes of taxation and allocation of legislative seats, and as barring Congress from prohibiting the
slave trade until 1808. Second, it was clear from article 1, section 2 of the Constitution that slaves were “persons”
within the meaning of the Constitution and that they counted for at least something in giving congressional seats to
slave states.
Taney and the Court majority—mostly Southerners—could have decided the other way by relying on the “persons”
language of the Constitution, and by careful study of the Court’s earlier decisions involving slavery. In 1825, Chief
Justice John Marshall, in a case entitled the Antelope, had written for the Court that slavery and the slave trade as
then practiced did not violate international law, and by extension the Constitution. However, in 1841, the famous
slavery case—the Amistad —came to the Supreme Court, and was widely supported by abolitionist forces. The
Court’s decision, written by Justice Joseph Story, did not say that slavery was unconstitutional. However, it upheld
the rights of Africans on board a slave ship to rise up and mutiny in order to defend their claim to freedom. Justice
Story referred to “eternal principles of justice and international law.”
Implicit even in the Antelope, and expressly in the Amistad , is the idea that Africans who claim freedom are persons
entitled to the law’s respect. “Respect” means nothing unless there is a mechanism to have it enforced by state
power. The Dred Scott decision simply held that there was a category of human beings utterly excluded, by
definition, from the constitutional compact—except to the limited extent that some states might allow Africans to be
free—and provided that if they had been slaves their owners were compensated.
Dred Scott, in the telling phrase used by my colleague Muneer Ahmad, had “no right to have rights,” according to the
Court’s majority. As a direct consequence of the Civil War that the Dred Scott decision made inevitable, the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution abolished slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment made express what one
had thought should be implicit in the Constitution:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Of course, after 1872, the Southern states made a virtual dead letter of these Fourteenth Amendment commands by
enacting “Black Codes” that excluded the former slaves from all the rights of persons and citizens, and these legal
barriers were not struck down until the mid-twentieth century. Their effects persist today.
This idea that the state can exclude a class of persons from all means to enforce claims for justice did not originate
in the Dred Scott decision itself, nor necessarily in the legal ideology of slavery. Earlier in the nineteenth century, the
Cherokee Nation of Native Americans had organized in order to resist white settlers taking its historically occupied
lands. It went into federal court to vindicate its claims against the state of Georgia. As I wrote in the second edition of
Law and the Rise of Capitalism:
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The Cherokee Nation of Georgia adopted a written constitution and asserted sovereignty over its land. The Georgia
legislature responded by declaring Cherokee laws and customs void and opening Cherokee land to settlement. The
federal Congress, at the urging of President Andrew Jackson, passed legislation seeking to compel Native
Americans to give up and move Westward. Georgia authorities arrested, tried and hanged a Cherokee for an
offense allegedly committed on Cherokee territory.
The Cherokee Nation sought relief in the Courts.2 They were, after all, a nation. They sought to restrain the
enforcement of Georgia laws which “go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for
the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties
reportedly made and still in force.” The Cherokee’s lawyer invoked the Supreme Court’s power, saying that the
lawsuit was between a foreign nation—the Cherokee—and the State of Georgia. Under the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court could exercise its original jurisdiction over such a lawsuit—without waiting for lower
courts to decide it and then hearing the case on appeal.
Chief Justice Marshall looked to the constitutional grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce with
“foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” He found the Cherokee to be “a
domestic, dependent nation” that was “in a state of pupilage,” like “that of a ward to his guardian.” It was not, he said
for the Court a true “foreign nation.” Thus, the Cherokee Nation had no legal existence. It could not even come to a
federal court to vindicate its treaty rights.
The Court decided Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1830, over the dissents of Justices Story and Thompson. Two
years later, in Worcester v. Georgia,3 Chief Justice Marshall retreated a bit, and held that Georgia did not have the
right to regulate activities on the Cherokee lands. He did not reach this result by recognizing the position of the
Cherokee nation, but by denigrating the right of a state such as Georgia to interfere in matters that are essentially
federal. That is, the national government had the constitutional power to deal with Native Americans and the states
had only a limited role to play.
Cherokee Nation is an early formulation of imperialist ideology, justifying the exclusion of “subject peoples” from any
access to forums in which they might assert their rights by invoking a plenary and unreviewable power in the hands
of executive power. The common thread that runs through Cherokee Nation, Dred Scott, and the enemy combatant
characterization of which Paye writes is this complete exclusion of claims for justice from any possibility of
discussion.
By contrast, a political group or an individual may invoke rights to freedom of expression and association. Having
gained access to a constitutionally created tribunal, the court will engage in a debate about how those ideas should
be expressed in rules of conduct. The court will then evaluate the facts and apply those rules.
The experience of decades teaches us that these constitutionally created courts often defer unreasonably to the
executive branch, as to how rules should be formulated and facts determined. The constitutional promise of
impartiality is another lie the regime tells the people. Even when the process can be seen as fair, there is no
guarantee against unjust results. The point, however, is that the regime is the general run of cases telling the people
that there is access to something that calls itself justice, and that the tribunals established under that promise
engage in certain defined procedures that contribute to a sense that the results are fairly arrived at.
The newly invented enemy combatant category, particularly when applied to non-citizens, short-circuits the
connection between state power and the person against whom that power is to be exercised. The Bush
administration invokes characterization—a label—to take any question of rights out of the debate. This is a familiar
technique to students of bourgeois legal history. In 1842, Marx wrote an essay on “the law relating to thefts of wood,”
and described how the Prussian state had made a peasant mode of living illegal by the simple device of declaring
fallen branches to be the property of the person who owned the tree. Peasants who had historically gathered the
fallen branches to build cooking and heating fires were thus further marginalized and forced into the ranks of wage
laborers. The English Black Acts of 1721 and after, so brilliantly chronicled by E. P. Thompson, worked the same
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kind of harm on the English peasantry, and with the same objective.
One should also call to mind the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans. Many Colorado cities had adopted
legislation protecting gay rights in various ways. In a statewide referendum in 1992, Colorado voters approved a
state constitutional amendment that prohibited all legislative, judicial, or executive action at any level of state
government that would recognize the rights of gay people to be free from discrimination. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that this state constitutional amendment violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority of six justices, said that the law singled out gay
people as having no right whatsoever to seek redress against discrimination. In private conversation, Justice
Kennedy has said that to him the Colorado provision seemed like the Dred Scott decision in its intent and effect.
The Court’s decision in Romer, and Justice Kennedy’s comment, calls to mind another idea about the enemy
combatant classification. The proclamations and statutes create a class of persons who are asserted to possess
certain dangerous characteristics. These persons are to be hauled before commissions to determine which specific
characteristics they have allegedly exhibited by their conduct. This is a classic bill of attainder, forbidden by the
Constitution. For example, in United States v. Brown, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that made it a crime
for a member of the Communist Party to hold a labor union office, because the statute created a class of suspect
persons and singled them out for punishment without requiring a judicial trial to decide if they had done any
particular wrongful acts.
It remains to examine the ostensible justification for creating a system that permits wholesale denial of rights.
Already, the newspapers are carrying reports that this or that detainee has confessed to participating in armed action
against American targets, and military officers are being quoted in the press as promising more such revelations. A
quick response to these reports is a rhetorical “does anyone believe anything this administration says?,” coupled
with another shake of the head at how credulous most of the media have become.
A more serious answer lies in the texts of the presidential proclamations and congressional enactments themselves.
While the MCA expressly disavows torture, it insulates Americans who practice it from liability. The government
argues that it permits use in evidence of statements obtained in violation of this limited prohibition, prior to the
statute’s enactment. Moreover, President Bush has accompanied his signature on the legislation with a signing
statement that casts doubt on whether the statute’s command will be obeyed. In any event, the administration has
taken so limited a view of what torture entails as to encourage forms of interrogation long condemned by the
international community. In short, these alleged “confessions” are the product of long, solitary, and inhuman
detention accompanied by interrogations that have historically been denounced as leading to untrue acceptance of
liability. As I write these words, eighteen British sailors are in Iranian custody for violating Iran’s territorial waters. At
least one of the sailors has appeared on television apologizing for the intrusion. Much of the press carries this
statement as a “confession,” with the word in quotation marks signifying distrust of Iran’s interrogation methods,
while the same publications omit the quotation marks when discussing Guantánamo.
When there is any inquiry, from citizens, media representatives, or even the legislative branch about exactly what
methods of interrogation are being used at Guantánamo and other, even more isolated, prisons, the administration
is quick to claim that this is a state secret. Indeed, in the Guantánamo proceedings, the government has sought to
prevent lawyers from knowing the interrogation techniques, assertedly because if terrorists knew how they would be
interrogated, they could prepare themselves to withstand the methods to be used.
One recent disclosure from Guantánamo is that a Tanzanian, Ahmed Ghailani, and a Pakistani, Walid abin Attash,
confessed to helping plan the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. They are among
detainees recently transferred to Guantánamo from secret CIA prisons. In those prisons, they were without doubt
subjected to torture. What will happen to these two men? They are subject to a death penalty at the hands of a
military commission, and have already been punished by their confinement and treatment, without any judicial trial
or opportunity to obtain review of their detention or conditions. Readers may recall that in 2001, four men were tried
in New York federal court for participating in the embassy bombings. The government sought the death penalty.
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One defendant, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, was arrested in South Africa, having gone there from Tanzania. The FBI
and some lower-level South African officials fabricated a story that he had consented to be sent to the United States
to face a capital trial, and on this basis he was flown to New York.
The South African Constitutional Court took the case and held that the rendition was unlawful under South African
and international law. The court’s judgment exposed the fraudulent means used to bring Mohamed to the United
States. Under American law, however, the illegal rendition did not prevent him from being tried. At his trial, Mohamed
was convicted, but Judge Sand instructed the jury that it could consider in mitigation of a potential death sentence
that if the United States had obeyed the law, Mohamed would not have faced the prospect of a death sentence. This
was an accurate statement because, among other reasons, South Africa would never permit a lawful extradition
without attaching a condition that the defendant could not face capital punishment.
At the federal trial defendants had the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and were guaranteed that the
judge would consider whether evidence was lawfully obtained. In that trial, the jury refused to approve a death
sentence for any defendant.
In the cases of Ghailani and Attash, the United States has found a way to avoid all the inconveniences of due
process, because now they are no longer “persons” entitled to such a thing. The “alien enemy combatant”
characterization has short-circuited all entitlement to a judicial trial for a crime clearly defined and clearly within the
congressionally defined jurisdiction of U.S. courts and juries. One should recall that in the CIA prisons, such as the
one where Ghailani was held, the Bush administration claims that no treaty limits the interrogation techniques that
may be used; the Bush administration and the CIA take the position that congressional restrictions on interrogation
in the MCA do not apply to CIA interrogators. In fact, Ghailani is named in the indictment under which the four
defendants tried in 2001 were charged. The Bush administration’s proclamation took a criminal defendant out of the
process in order to deprive him of rights.
I do not, of course, harbor the illusion that people of color, or those of any color accused of complicity with terrorists,
in “ordinary” criminal cases are routinely treated in a constitutionally respectful way. I have written on that subject in
Monthly Review.4 As Roland Barthes has written, the system that calls itself “justice” is always ready to judge you
as you must be, and not as you are—as a social construct and not as a human being. But when the system
behaves in these ways, one has at least the opportunity to compare its performance with the state’s own proclaimed
standards, and to have the benefits of publicity and courtroom confrontation.
We, the lawyers, will continue our work, seeking to bring these issues into the open in the forums that remain
available to us, and advancing all the arguments and interpretations that we can think of. Our commitment to this
important work should not lead anyone, and perhaps especially us, to ignore what is happening as the state
unilaterally casts aside any pretense of impartiality or of an obligation to act in fair and accountable ways.

Notes
1. ↩ Indeed, if the pirate was an alien, he would get the additional protection of a jury, half of whose members
were aliens—the jury “de mediatate linguae.” See Respublica v. Mesca, 1 Dall. 73, 1 L.Ed. 42; People v.
McLean, 2 Johns.(N.Y.) 381. This practice has been abrogated. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,
145 (1936).
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